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The Complex Litigation Project's 
Choice of Law Rules for Mass Torts 
and How to Escape Them 
[Ildentifiing and analyzing the issues in controversy and the 
debate that centers on those issues may be of more lasting 
importance than any particular solution; no choice of law 
solution will accommodate everyone's concerns. Only if we are 
able to organize the core issues that need to be addressed in 
any choice of law proposal will there be the possibility of 
slowly working toward a consensus on these matters.' 
On May 13, 1993, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
adopted the Statutory Recommendations (the "Proposal") of the 
Complex Litigation project2 and recommended it for passage 
by Congress. The Complex Litigation Project (the "Project") 
contemplates large-scale consolidation of complex litigation in a 
single state or federal court. The types of cases that would be 
affected by the Proposal are those involving hundreds, 
thousands, and even millions of litigants who are seeking to 
litigate mass tort or contract issues in either the state or 
federal court system. Examples of tort cases likely to be 
consolidated under the Proposal are products liability 
lit igati~n,~ securities litigation, air crashes, and other mass 
torts.4 The Project has been highly praised in some circles.' It 
1. Mary K. Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: 
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309, 311 (1991). 
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMEN- 
DATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994), [hereinabr COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL]. The 
Proposal is the result of ten years of work on the Project, which was led by 
Professors Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane as Reporters. 
3. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 713 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); see also P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALI's 
Complex Litigation Project: A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L. REV. 953, 968 (1994) 
(identifying product liability cases and single-event accident cases as the two major 
patterns of mass torts in the United States). 
4. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases (Hyatt Regency Hotel Disaster, 
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has also been roundly disparaged by its c r i t i d  One of the 
more debated parts of the Project has been its choice of law 
provisions, which are contained in Chapter 6 of the Proposal. 
This discussion of the Project's choice of law rules is confined to 
section 6.01, the proposed approach to mass tort choice of law. 
Choice of law questions present some of the most complicated 
issues in the American procedural system. And not 
surprisingly, the complexity of these issues increases 
exponentially in the case of mass tort litigation, as countless 
litigants engage in multiforum civil litigation. As a result, the 
Project's means of dealing with the significant choice of law 
questions posed by multiforum consolidation of litigation are of 
central importance in assessing the value of the proposed 
federal legislation. 
The approach of the Project in the area of mass tort choice 
of law is to codify precise, mechanical, even rigid rules for 
determining which state's law will apply to consolidated 
litigation. Underlying the entire choice of law approach is the 
driving intention of the Project to ensure that one state's law 
will apply to common issues, notwithstanding the fact that the 
involved litigants may hail from all fifty states as well as 
foreign nations, and regardless of the fact that many litigants 
may have no contact at  all with the state whose law would 
apply under the strictures of section 6.01. While such 
mechanical uniformity would likely lead to increased efficiency 
in the handling of complex litigation, the potential for unfair 
results is implicit in the approach chosen by the Project and 
recommended by subsections 6.01(a), (c), and (d). 
An escape hatch from the "one-state's-law" rule is found in 
subsection 6.01(b), which allows for the division of litigants into 
July 17, 1981), 97 F.R.D. 365 W.D. Mo. 1982). 
5. See, e.g., Symeon C .  Symeonides, The ALI's Complex Litigation Project: 
Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843, 844 (1994) ("It is perhaps 
the most innovative, resourceful, and ambitious work ever undertaken in the 
United States on the subject of multistate complex litigation."); see also James A.R. 
Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the 
Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1994) ("The AZII Project deserves great 
credit for citing and clearly summarizing leading scholarship about choice of law in 
mass tort cases. It is striking, however, that the cited literature and the Project 
itself seldom stray beyond a select few cases."). 
6. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposal for 
Fedemlly-Mandated Choice of Law in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State 
Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085 (1994); David E. Seidelson, Section 6.01 of the 
ALrs Complex Litigation Project: Function Follows Form, 54 LA. L. REV. 1111, 
11 11 (1994) (deriding the Project's "jerry-built choice-of-law provision"). 
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subgroups for the purpose of applying a different state's law to 
each.? There is potential for this provision to diminish the 
harshness of the one-state rule and still preserve significant 
gains in efficiency. This thesis will be discussed below. 
The present purpose of this article is to discuss the choice 
of law approach for mass torts contained in the Proposal in 
light of modern American choice of law theory. Part I1 of this 
paper includes a brief discussion of some of the theories that 
influence modern choice of law in the United States. The 
precise rules embodied in section 6.01 of the Proposal are set 
forth in Part III(A), while Part III(B) seeks to illuminate the 
theoretical underpinnings of the Drafkers' chosen approach to 
choice of law. Part III(C) is an analysis of the debate that has 
taken place regarding the approach of section 6.01, while Part 
III(D) contains a suggestion on the proper use and scope of 
subsection 6.01(b). 
Part IV concludes that the debate over section 6.01 
generally will continue uninhibited, especially if Congress 
determines to consider some form of the Proposal's provisions 
for passage, and that subsection 6.01(b) should be used 
liberally to help preserve fair results and to comport with 
litigants' expectations as to applicable law. While such liberal 
application of the escape hatch might not have been contem- 
plated by the Reporters to the Complex Litigation Project, it 
may be essential in order to make the proposal attractive 
federal legislation. Therefore, if Congress should take up the 
issue of passing some derivative of the Proposal, it should 
make clear its intent that subsection 6.01(b) be used liberally 
and regularly by the federal courts. 
A. Current State of Choice of Law Theory 
There are two prerequisites to establishing a choice of law 
question in a tort case. First, two or more states must be in- 
volved, since if all contacts with the tortious act involve only 
one state, no other state could reasonably seek to apply its law 
to the process of determining a remedy. This requirement 
would seem to be satisfied in the vast majority of cases contem- 
plated by the Complex Litigation Pro je~ t .~  
7. Parallel provisions appear in 5 6.02(b) and in 4 6.03(b), allowing for 
subdivision of litigants in mass contract cases. 
8. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 4 3.01(b). The Proposal 
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Second, the laws of the competing states must be in con- 
flict with each other. In other words, the various states must 
have different methods of remedying the particular tortious 
~onduc t .~  Again, since the majority of mass torts that would 
qualify for consolidation under the legislation proposed by the 
Project would apparently involve litigants having contacts with 
multiple jurisdictions, this requirement would likely be satis- 
fied in the vast majority of consolidated cases emerging fkom 
the Complex Litigation Panel. In short, the very nature of the 
mass tort cases sought to be affected by the Complex Litigation 
Project forecasts significant choice of law problems in consoli- 
dated cases, a fact that is compounded by the Reporters' inter- 
est in having "a single state's law [apply] to all similar tort 
claims being asserted against a defendant."1° 
1. First Restatement of Conflict of Laws: lex loci delicti 
The traditional choice of law rule in torts cases originally 
adopted by each state is lex loci delicti:" the forum state ap- 
plies the law of "the state where the last event necessary to 
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."12 The 
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopted the doctrine of 
lex loci delicti-the "place of injury" rule.13 The First Restate- 
urges interdistrict consolidation when the number of parties and actions and the 
geographic dispersion of those actions are such that significant gains in efficiency 
can be attained. See id. Intuitively, these guidelines would seem to apply most fre- 
quently when the tortious conduct has had far-reaching effects to the extent that 
many states (and/or foreign sovereigns) would have contacts with the subject of the 
litigation. Specifically, the cases most frequently alluded to by the Reporters in 
8 6.01, the Proposal's Mass Torts choice of law section, are those involving prod- 
ucts liability, airline crashes, and securities litigation. See generally id. Chapter 6, 
Introductory Note and comments to 8 6.01. In short, it seems that if a particular 
set of cases is sufficiently complex and its litigants are sufficiently numerous and 
diverse for the proposed Complex Litigation Panel to order consolidation, the set of 
cases will normally have contact with a sufficient number of states and/or sover- 
eigns for this first prerequisite to be satisfied. 
9. See Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Con- 
flict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34 MERCER L. REV. 593, 597 (1983). 
10. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 6.01(a). 
11. Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of 
Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 51 (1989). 
12. RESTATEMENT OF CON~ICT OF LAWS 8 377 (1934). 
13. See id. Lex loci delicti stems from the common-law "vested rights" doc- 
trine, under which "each state conceptually had control over all incidents within its 
borders. Each state had jurisdiction to determine the effect of tortious acts commit- 
ted within the state. Only the jurisdiction where the dispute arose was capable of 
giving the parties the right to a cause of action in court." Leigh Ann Miller, 
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ment formulation of the rule can best be described as a set of 
rigid conflicts rules, which dominated American conflicts law 
for decades.14 The benefits of the traditional rule "include its 
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of application."15 In- 
deed, the rule's mechanical application would seem to give po- 
tential litigants a rather clear indication of which state's law 
would apply to any dispute. 
However, among the disadvantages of lex loci delicti is the 
fact that the state where the injury occurred may have no other 
contact with the litigation, a particularly important point in the 
context of the single-event mass disaster such as an airline 
crash. Further, application of the doctrine often results in 
harsh decisions and involves little balancing of interests or 
equities? Commentators argue that the few states still ad- 
hering to the doctrine do so because of the faults of other, more 
modern theories. l7 
Due to the rigidity of lex loci delicti, states began to rec- 
ognize exceptions to the rule,18 applying the law of the forum 
to procedural issues,lg or applying the forum law "if the lex 
loci choice contradicted the forum's 'public Eventu- 
Choice-of-Law Approaches in Tort Actions, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 859, 861 & 
1111.12-15 (1993). The principal American proponent of the vested rights doctrine 
was Joseph H. Beale, the reporter of the First Restatement, although the doctrine 
had European proponents, including Dicey. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CON- 
FLICT OF LAWS # 2.5, at 13 (1992) [hereinafter SCOLES & HAY]. Dicey's formulation 
was that: "'Any right which has been duly acquired under the law of any civilized 
country is recognized and, in general, enforced by English Courts, and no right 
which has not been duly acquired is enforced or, in general, recognized by English 
Courts.'" Id. (quoting DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE 
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 16-22 passim (1896)). Beale's formulation is analogous: 
"'A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its exis- 
tence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in 
question anywhere.'" Id. (quoting J.H. BEALE, 3 CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 
517 (1901)). 
14. Scorns & HAY, supra note 13, # 2.5, at  15. "[Mlany of the 'basic rules' of 
the First Restatement remain and continue to be retained" even today, although 
often only as one choice among several, as in the Second Restatement. Id. # 2.5, a t  
15-16. 
15. Miller, supra note 13, at  861. 
16. See id. at  864 & 11.49. Scoles and Hay characterize lex loci delicti as 
"fixed and thus mechanical-but also predictable." Scorns & HAY, supra note 13, 
# 2.6, at 16. 
17. See Herma H. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 
MERCER L. REV. 521, 583 (1983); Miller, supra note 13, at  864. 
18. Miller, supra note 13, at  861. 
19. See Solimine, supra note 11, at  51. 
20. Id. at 52-53. 
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ally, the majority of American states came to reject lex loci 
del i~t i .~ '  
Dissatisfaction with the fixed, mechanical First Restate- 
ment approach spawned numerous new suggestions and re- 
sponses, resulting in what is considered a "revolution" in Amer- 
ican conflicts law.22 In true revolutionary fashion, commenta- 
tors proposed myriad alternatives to lex loci d e l i ~ t i . ~ ~  
2. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: the "most signifi- 
cant relationship" test 
The approach of the Second Restatement may be fairly 
characterized as a formula for finding the "right line" between 
rigidity and flexibility in choice of law situations. Accordingly, 
21. Only fifteen jurisdictions currently adhere to lex loci delicti in deciding 
choice-of-law questions. Miller, supra note 13, a t  863 & 11.32 (listing Alabama, 
Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming as 
states that follow lex loci delicti). 
22. Peter Hay & Robert B. Ellis, Bridging the Gap Between Rules and Ap- 
proaches in Tort Choice of Law in the United States: A Survey of Current Case 
Law, 27 INTX LAW 369, 370 (1993); see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, 8 2.6, 
a t  16. 
23. These theories include Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, see 
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 182 (1963) (advo- 
cating application of the forum law unless the foreign state has a legitimate policy 
interest in enforcing its laws and the forum state has no policy interest in the 
case); Ehrenzweig's Lex Fori Theory, see Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the 
United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1050 (1987) (discussing Ehrenzweig's lex fori 
theory, which entails the nearly wholesale application of the forum state's law); the 
modern Interest-Balancing Theories of von Mehren, Trautman and Weintraub, set 
forth variously in A.T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF 
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 341-75 (James Kasner ed., 1965); A.T. von Mehren, Recent 
Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL . REV. 927 (1975); RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 270, 345-46 (1980) (each 
stressing the importance of weighing competing jurisdictions' interests in having 
their respective laws applied to cases); Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations, 
set forth originally in Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Con- 
flicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966) (identifying five independent consider- 
ations-predictability, interstate order, simplicity, government interest, and applica- 
tion of the better rule-that courts should weigh in deciding which law to apply); 
the Second Restatement's "Most Significant Relationship" test, see discussion infra, 
part II.A.2; and, finally, court-elected Eclecticism, which is the judicial policy adopt- 
ed by a small minority of states of selecting various hybrids of the above theories, 
see William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mish- 
mash?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1983) (criticizing eclectic choice of law as 
"methodless ad hoc decisionmaking." Id a t  651.); James E. Westbrook, A Survey 
and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 
40 MO. L. REV. 407, 412 (1975) (praising the versatility of Eclecticism). See gener- 
ally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, $8 2.6-3. 
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the Second Restatement "draws on much of the thought of the 
period during which it was drafted (1952-1971) and attempts to 
provide as much of 'the right line,' the balance [between rigid 
rules and flexible principles], as was possible in the light of the 
development of the law at  that time."24 Thus the Second Re- 
statement represents what might be called the best thinking on 
choice of law since the First Restatement's adoption of lex loci 
delicti, and it is the approach selected by a plurality of states 
(22) to replace lex loci d e l i ~ t i . ~ ~  
The Second Restatement approach principally consists of 
three elements: the policy guidelines of section 6, the "most 
significant relationship" concept, and various lists of connecting 
factors. Section 6 provides that, absent a statutory directive on 
choice of law, a court will consider various factors relevant to 
the choice of law issue.26 These factors include 
the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
the relevant policies of the forum, 
the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of 
the particular issue, 
the protection of justified expectations, 
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
ease in the determination and application of the law to 
be a~plied.~' 
Since these factors are not listed in order of priority, they do 
not enable the court to choose any particular state's law over 
that of another state. 
However, the factors become more significant in light of 
other sections of the Second Restatement, particularly section 
145, which provides for application of the law of the state with 
the "most significant relationship" to the transaction or occur- 
rence in tort cases.28 Section 145 further provides the relevant 
24. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, 9 2.13, at 34-35. 
25. Miller, supra note 13, at 872 & 11.127 (listing Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennes- 
see, Texas, and Washington). 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF C O ~ I C T  OF LAWS 9 6 (1971). 
27. Id. 5 6(2). 
28. Id. § 145(1). Section 146 of the Second Restatement applies to personal 
injuries: 
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"connecting factors" that will apply to individual choice of law 
issues: 
(a) the place where the injury occurred, 
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, 
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation 
and place of business of the parties, and 
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the par- 
ties is centered?' 
The effect of the Second Restatement is thus to "soften the 
rigidity of the old [First Restatement] approach" by making the 
single connecting factor of the old system-place of injury-just 
one of several factors to be considered in the choice of law de- 
termination, and by providing the "most significant relation- 
ship" test as a "guiding prin~iple."~~ The Second Restatement 
drew severe criticism, both during its preparation and after its 
adoption by the ALI.31 Notwithstanding its detractors, the 
Second Restatement also attracted glowing praise and a sig- 
nificant following.32 Included in that following was J.H.C. 
Moms, who praised the Second Restatement as "'the most 
impressive, comprehensive and valuable work on the conflict of 
laws that has ever been produced in any country, in any lan- 
guage, at  any time.'"33 
Critics of the Second Restatement's approach argue that it 
does not adequately emphasize the policies behind local law34 
In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the 
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, 
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more signifi- 
cant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and 
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be ap- 
plied. 
Id. 6 146. Thus, section 146 reserves the lex loci delicti preferences for the forum 
where the injury took place unless another state has a more significant interest in 
the litigation. 
29. Id. !j 145(2). Section 145 further provides that "[tlhese contacts are to be 
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular 
issue." Id. 
30. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, 8 2.14, at  37. 
31. Not surprisingly, among the most vocal critics were Currie and 
Ehrenzweig. Id. at  38. 
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
33. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, § 2.14, at  38 (quoting J.H.C. Morris, Law 
and Reason Triumphant or: How Not to Review a Restatement, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 
322, 324 (1973)). 
34. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 
34 MERCER L. REV. 501, 518 (1983). 
10811 CHOICE OF LAW FOR MASS TORTS 1089 
and that its mechanical weighing of interests is often insuffi- 
~ i e n t . ~ ~  True enough, the approach of the Second Restatement 
is to weigh all values equally:6 and when the court deter- 
mines that two or more states have equal interests, some other 
method of decision-a tiebreaker-is called for.37 
A. The Mechanics of Section 6.01 
The legislation proposed by the ALI's Complex Litigation 
Project represents a major departure from modem choice of law 
theory and from modern federal practice. Section 6.01 of the 
Complex Litigation Proposal is composed of a series of fairly 
rigid rules, including a hierarchical list of different ways of 
determining which state's law will apply to complex litigation 
transferred pursuant to the Proposal's transfer sections, sec- 
tions 3.01 and 5 .01 .~~  
First, subsection (a) of section 6.01 identifies the driving 
force behind the Project's choice of law approach: the transferee 
court is to choose the applicable law with an eye single to "ap- 
plying, to the extent feasible, a single state's law to all similar 
tort claims being asserted against a defendant."g 
Second, the Proposal outlines in subsection (c) the three 
factors a court must consider to determine which states have a 
policy that would be firthered by the application of their state 
law in a transferred proceeding: the place or places of injury, 
the place or places of conduct causing the injury, and the pri- 
mary place of business or habitual residences of the plaintiffs 
and  defendant^.^' The Proposal then deals with the false con- 
35. Kay, supra note 17, at 559. 
36. See Reese, supra note 34, at 515. 
37. Kay, supra note 17, at 560. 
38. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 6.01. 
39. Id. 8 6.01(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (a) reads in full: 
(a) Except as provided in 8 6.04 through 8 6.06, in actions consoli- 
dated under 8 3.01 or removed under 8 5.01 in which the parties assert 
the application of laws that are in material conflict, the transferee court 
shall choose the law governing the rights, liabilities, and defenses of the 
parties with respect to a tort claim by applying the criteria set forth in 
subsections (c)-(e) with the objective of applying, to the extent feasible, a 
single state's law to all similar  to^ claims being asserted against a defen- 
dant. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
40. Id. 8 6.01k). 
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flict situation, charging the court, if only one state has a policy 
that would be furthered by the application of its law, to apply 
that state's law.41 More significantly, in the case of a true con- 
flict, subsection (d) of section 6.01 provides the court a hierar- 
chical list of rules to determine which state's law will apply: 
(1) If the place of the injury and the place of the conduct 
causing the injury are in the same state, that state's law 
governs. 
(2) If subsection (d)(l) does not apply, but all of the 
plaintiffs habitually reside or have their primary places of 
business in the same state, and a defendant has its primary 
place of business or habitually resides in that state, that 
state's law governs the claims with respect to that defendant. 
Plaintiffs shall be considered as sharing a common habitual 
residence or primary place of business if they are located in 
states whose laws are not in material conflict. 
(3) If neither subsection (d)(l) nor (d)(2) applies, but all 
of the plaintiffs habitually reside or have their primary places 
of business in the same state, and that state also is the place 
of injury, then that state's law governs. Plaintiffs shall be 
considered as sharing a common habitual residence or prima- 
ry place of business if they are located in states whose laws 
are not in material conflict. 
(4) In all other cases, the law of the state where the 
conduct causing the injury occurred governs. When conduct 
occurred in more than one state, the court shall choose the 
law of the conduct state that has the most significant rela- 
tionship to the o~currence.'~ 
The effect of subsection (d) is that subsection (4)-applying the 
rule of the state where the conduct causing the tort injury oc- 
curred-will determine the choice of law in the vast majority of 
section 6.01 cases, since the restrictive geographic rules on 
party residence found in subsections (dX1)-(3), by their very 
terms, will rarely be satisfied in the dispersed-injury mass torts 
Subsection (b) provides an escape hatch from the rigidity of 
subsections (a), (c), and (d): in the case that the court deter- 
mines that the application of a single state's law would be 
41. Id. 5 6.01(d). 
42. Id. 
43. Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1640-41 (1992). 
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inappropriate, it "may divide the actions into subgroups of 
claims, issues, or parties to foster consolidated treatment under 
section 3.01, and allow more than one state's law to be ap- 
plied ."44 
Finally, subsection (e) provides that the transferee court 
may inject additional factors-factors not enumerated in sub- 
section (c)-into the equation for determining the applicable 
law or may depart from the order of preferences in subsection 
(d) in order to "avoid unfair surprise or arbitrary results."45 
B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Section 6.01 
The Reporters' road map of the thought process behind the 
drafting of section 6.01 begins inauspiciously at best: "Certain- 
ly, the most direct way to attempt to solve the issues posed [by 
choice of law in the complex litigation context] would be to 
adopt national standards to govern the conduct of individuals 
or entities . . . who now are controlled by multiple, sometimes 
conflicting, state laws."46 Having thus conceded that the 
Project's approach is no better than second-best,47 the Report- 
ers then proceed to outline the approach of Chapter 6. Again 
restating the global objectives of the Complex Litigation Pro- 
ject-to "foster[] the fair, just, and efficient resolution of the 
cases embraced by [the] Proje~t"~~-the Reporters address two 
initial issues: first, whether sufficient justification exists to 
change the "current reliance on state choice of law rules,"" 
and second, whether a federal choice of law code should simply 
allow for the development of federal common law, whether i t  
should give the federal courts discretion to evaluate policies 
and interests from an enumerated list, or whether it should 
44. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 6.01(b) (emphasis added). 
45. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 6.01(e). This subject thus 
offers a second escape hatch from the rigors of subsection (d). 
46. Id. a t  305. Noting the remote possibility of "reaching a political consensus 
on what the appropriate federal standard should be" and doubting the resolve of 
"Congress to intrude so directly into areas historically governed by state law," the 
Reporters consign their fate to proposing an  admittedly less attractive, more indi- 
rect solution-the procedural approach of 8 6.01. Id. 
47. Even those who praise the Proposal make this observation. See, e.g., 
Kozyris, supra note 3, a t  953. 
48. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  305. 
49. Id. This issue is germane since the adoption of a federal statutory choice 
of law code for complex litigation would necessarily intrude on an  area long gov- 
erned by state law. Id. 
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prescribe more precise, mechanical rules on how to select 
among competing state interests?' 
The Reporters elected the more precise, mechanical route. 
They apparently felt that this decision best served the goal of 
promoting efficiency in the handling of complex litigation and 
found that "reasonably precise" choice of law rules would pro- 
vide sufficient predictability and avoid conflicting results.51 
Despite what may be said in criticism of this approach, the 
Reporters must be credited for their honesty and forthright- 
ness: having elected the precise, mechanical approach to feder- 
alizing choice of law, they confess that "[als will become clear 
when the details of the following sections are examined, this 
choice of law approach is an imperfect solution at best because 
it requires the use of a highly complex set of standards in order 
to accommodate the varying interests involved."52 
The Reporters justify the decision to adopt the rigid federal 
statutory approach by citing the need to discourage forum 
shopping and the need to simplify the "extremely complicated 
inquiry now needed" to select the applicable law in consolidated 
cases." Thus, under the Project's approach, litigants would 
purportedly have no incentive to forum shop for the most favor- 
able law, since the applicable law will be selected regardless of 
the plaintiffs choice of forum and likely without regard for the 
interests and expectations of many litigants. 
As to the complicated inquiry required of courts under 
current choice of law theory, the Reporters' criticisms appear 
plausible: "Even if one presumes that courts can divine unset- 
tled state law with some degree of accuracy, there is sufficient 
leeway in any analysis of governing law questions so that the 
choice of law decision may be very ad h o ~ . " ~ ~  Further compli- 
cating the matter in the context of complex litigation is the fact 
that, under current choice of law analysis, "more than one 
choice of law rule may have to be applied, creating burdensome 
individual issues that may be incompatible with consolidated 
treatment? Thus, allowing the transferee court to select and 
apply a single choice of law rule, reason the Reporters, elimi- 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 305-06. 
52. Id. at 306 (emphasis added). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 307. 
55. Id. 
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nates this complication, provides for more predictability, and 
allows "the development of a coherent body of law applying the 
federal ~ t a n d a r d . " ~ ~  The intended result would be increased 
judicial efficiency and fairne~s.~' 
It  is clear from the commentary accompanying the Propos- 
al that the compelling purpose of the choice of law section is to 
achieve the "highly desirable" result of applying a single state's 
law to each particular issue that is common to all claims and 
parties in the l i t iga t i~n .~~  The Project concedes, however, that 
the division of consolidated cases into issues may be necessary 
in order to ensure that only truly common issues are treated 
"in the agg~egate."~' Once the purely common issues have 
been separated from the noncommon issues, the Project's inter- 
est in efficiency calls for application of one state's law to the 
common issues.60 The Project even contemplates application of 
the federal choice of law standard upon remand, unless "justice 
requires ~therwise,"~' so that the efficiency achieved by apply- 
ing a single state's law to common claims is achieved in the 
state courts as well. 
The Project nonetheless recognizes the fact that "[iln some 
circumstances it may not be possible or desirable to have a 
single state's law control."62 In such circumstances it may be 
that consolidation should be avoided or aborted, or else limited 
to certain kinds of claims and/or issues.63 Another, and per- 
haps more attractive, option would be to subdivide the litiga- 
tion pursuant to subsection 6.01(b) "when it appears preferable 
that multiple state laws apply."4 
C. The Preceding and Ensuing Debate 
The rules adopted by the ALI in the Proposal are clearly 
the result of a major groundswell of debate in the area of mass 
torts choice of law. Among the issues central to this debate are 
the propriety of adopting a federal choice of law code in the 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 316. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 318. 
62. Id. at 316. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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first place and the proper approach of any such codification 
effort. 
1. The propriety of a federal choice of law code 
There seems to have been general agreement that seeking 
the passage of a federal choice of law code would be a worthy 
and worthwhile pursuit, notwithstanding the realization that a 
more direct solution would be to adopt federal substantive 
standards for liability.65 Professor Kozyris, for one, was a 
strong advocate for a federal choice of law code, since the likely 
alternative would be the conferral of federal common law-mak- 
ing authority on the federal courts, a prospect he finds distaste- 
ful? He thus regards the Proposal's simplified, mechanical 
rules as indicia of a desire to avoid "finessing" choice of law 
problems by "dumping the problem on the lap of the federal 
courts called upon to create new types of common law."67 
Professor Weintraub has agreed that a uniform choice of 
law code would simplify litigation of mass tort cases: 
Federal courts, when dealing with claims consolidated from 
many different forums, would not face the task of applying 
several choice-of-law approaches in the same opinion. More- 
over, a legislated rule would relieve the judge of making de 
novo the many difficult policy choices encountered in hc t ion-  
a1 choice-of-law analysis.68 
Other commentators echo the call for a uniform choice of law 
code, each with different insights on and criticisms of the 
Project's chosen methods?' 
2. The proper approach of the federal choice of law code 
Although there has been general agreement that drafting a 
federal choice of law code would be desirable, the scholarship 
divides quite sharply over the Project's approach, with particu- 
65. See id. at 305; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Project's settling for "second-best"). 
66. This is an option likewise considered, and rejected by the Drafters of the 
Proposal. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 305. 
67. Kozyris, supra note 3, at 955. 
68. Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in 
Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 145. 
69. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 2134 (1991). 
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lar debate over the proper role of interest-analysis in the mass 
torts context. 
a. Point: On one hand, supporters of the Project seem to 
advocate any theory but the modern interest-balancing ap- 
proach." Indeed, some writings, particularly those of Profes- 
sor Kozyris, evidence delight that the Proposal rejects the mod- 
ern, interest-balancing approach in favor of mechanical rules, 
heralding the decision as "[alvoiding the wrong turns of inter- 
est analy~is."~' 
Professor Nafziger has echoed these sentiments, opining 
that the Proposal's prioritization of connecting factors is a "wel- 
come departure &om the . . . troublesome Hydra of 'pure' gov- 
ernment interest analysis."72 According to Nafziger, the result 
of interest analysis is that objective analysis, "like the three- 
headed Hydra, . . . becomes the stuff of mythology" because 
courts are able to manipulate interest analysis "to justify al- 
most any result they want.''73 However, even Nafziger is not 
completely satisfied with the Proposal: "The ALI Project de- 
serves great credit for citing and clearly summarizing leading 
scholarship about choice of law in mass tort cases. It is strik- 
ing, however, that the cited literature and the Project itself 
seldom stray beyond a select few cases.''74 
Kozyris's criticisms of interest-balancing center around the 
belief that interest analysis involves ad hoc attempts to deter- 
mine the law of the controlling jurisdiction, which in turn in- 
cludes analysis of legislative intent that is "virtually nonexis- 
tent''; further, Kozyris has argued that the dogmatic "interests" 
involved in interest analysis are not only elusive, but also "ma- 
lignant."75 Not dissimilarly, Professor Juenger argues that 
"interest analysis has lost cohesion and coheren~e."'~ 
70. See, e.g., Kozyris, supra note 3, a t  955. 
71. Id. at  962. Kozyris argues that "but for the brilliance of Brainerd Currie 
and the favorable climate at the time for iconoclastic attacks on the traditional 
doctrine, [interest analysis] would have attracted much less attention." Id. Further, 
he trumpets the Project's approach as "a welcome decision to transcend the vague, 
subjective, and convoluted ad hoc methods advocated by the 'modern' conflicts theo- 
ries and to generate choice-of-law legal norms to cover most situations in princi- 
pled, predictable, efficient, and intelligible ways." Id. at 975. 
72. Nafziger, supra note 5, a t  1002. 
73. Id. at  1003. 
74. Id. 
75. Kozyris, supra note 3, at 963. 
76. Friedrich K. Juenger, Symposium on Interest Analysis in Conflict of Laws: 
An Inquiry into Fundamentals with a Side Glance at Products Liability: What 
Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 510 (1985). 
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Thus, supporters of the Proposal have lauded it for its 
rejection of interest analysis and its fixation on efficiency. 
Kozyris notes that the Project's choice of law rules will help 
fsee consolidated proceedings of "unnecessary complexities," 
namely complicated choice of law analysis.77 Thus, he views 
the adoption of the Proposal as the beginning of a much needed 
"catharsis, if not purgation," in the area of conflicts.78 He de- 
scribes the Project's reliance on mechanical rules as a "total 
rejection" of interest analysis, which he asserts to be an analy- 
sis fraught with "intrinsic indetemina~y."~~ Instead, the Pro- 
ject adopts "precise, reciprocal, comprehensive conflicts rules 
which will lead to predictable outcomes in most instances," ac- 
cording to its champions.80 Nonetheless, many would object to 
the mechanical nature of the Project's choice of law rules, call- 
ing for a more flexible approach, to which Kozyris would likely 
quote Judge Posner, who wrote, "The opponents of mechanical 
rules . . . may have given too little weight to the virtues of 
~irnplicity."~' 
b. Counterpoint: On the other hand, Professor Weintraub 
acknowledges that any federal choice of law code should be an 
easy rule to administer, one that would effect "a reasonable ac- 
77, See Kozyris, supm note 3, at  954-55. Kozyris begins his analysis of the 
Proposal "with ample praise for the fixation on conflicts efficiency." Id. at  956. He 
does, however, identify a potential irrationality in extending the Proposal's new- 
found efficiency only to "consolidated" cases in the federal courts, a distinction he 
regards as "questionable." Id. a t  954. 
78. Id. at 975. Notwithstanding his praise of the Proposal, Kozyris still de- 
scribes it as "a glass half full": first, # 6.01 is clearly not perfect in that it is 
"good for torts in general, but not custom-made enough to fit the typical mass 
torts in consolidated cases"; second, the key connectors of 4 6.01(d) are "not ade- 
quately highlighted, while certain peripheral factors are included in an excessively 
eclectic environment." Id. at  967-68. In this respect, Kozyris's criticism of interest 
analysis is analogous to Professor Juenger's criticism of conflicts academicians gen- 
erally when he said: 
Their predilection for theoretical speculations has trapped conflicts schol- 
ars in a time warp. Preoccupied with stale issues, they fail to come to 
grips with the more pressing problems of our days. Such neglect is re- 
grettable. Counsel and judges who must wrestle with these problems 
surely would welcome guidance from the experts. As for conflicts theory, a 
study of mass disaster cases could bring new insights to a discipline that 
is currently viewed as mired in sophistry and obfuscation. 
Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U .  ILL. L. 
REV. 105, 108, quoted in Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1625. 
79. Kozyris, supra note 3, at  965-66. 
80. Id. at 965. 
81. Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1987), 
quoted in Weintraub, supra note 68, at  131-32. 
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commodation of the policies underlying conflicting liability 
laws."82 Weintraub also opines that the code should embrace a 
certain amount of flexibility, "some play in the joints" rather 
than rigid rules, "so that the rule does not compel a bad result 
in an unusual or unforeseen circum~tance."~~ 
Weintraub is steadfast in his belief that the First Restate- 
ment approach has outlived its usefulness and thus should not 
have been incorporated into the Proposal. As he puts it, "Alas, 
it is probably too late to turn the choice-of-law clock back. Me- 
chanical conflicts rules, like mechanical rules in any field of 
law, cause covert resistance."" 
Professor Seidelson likewise remains a proponent of inter- 
est analysis and criticizes section 6.01 as a 'Serry-built choice- 
of-law provision," as it consists of a "little bit of interest analy- 
sis," too much of the Second Restatement, and several "seeming- 
ly slapdash subsections having no apparent legitimate anteced- 
ents" in conflict of laws.85 In one article, Professor Seidelson 
explores the practical function of subsections 6.01(d)(l)-(4), 
concluding that interest analysis is, after all, the preferable 
mode of analysis for mass tort choice of law.86 
Professor Mullenix likewise discounts the rules of the Com- 
plex Litigation Project Proposal, arguing that they do little to 
assist in determining the applicable law in "truly dispersed" 
mass tort litigati~n.~? As she says, "For the hard cases, the 
[Drafters] have proposed virtually useless rules."88 According 
to Mullenix, who acknowledges that the Proposal's "provisions 
and commentary sound perfectly plausible and reasoned (albeit 
reflecting the proposers' own conflicts preferences)," the rules of 
section 6.01 will not function adequately in the case of "truly 
massive" tort litigati~n.~' 
D. Escaping from Section 6.01 
As has been stated previously, the rules of section 6.01 
have been widely described as mechanical, certainty-assuring 
82. Weintraub, supra note 68, at 145. 
83. Id. Weintraub would have preferred a choice of law approach that applied 
the law of the plaintiff's habitual residence. Id. at 156. 
84. Id. at 133. 
85. Seidelson, supra note 6, at 1111. 
86. Id. at 1137. 
87. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1630. 
88. Id. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
89. Id. at 1630-31. 
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approaches to choice of law. Critics of the rule deride the me- 
chanics of the section as "rigid" constraints, while supporters 
prefer to use the term "precise."g0 Notwithstanding the 
section's intended precision or rigidity, it is clear the Drafters 
intended to inject some flexibility and reasonableness into the 
law-choosing process when they drafted and adopted subsection 
6.01(b), the "escape hatch." Just like the exception to the me- 
chanical rules in subsection 6.01(e), subsection 6.01(b) should 
be used liberally, "when appr~priate,"~' to deal fairly with 
mass tort cases. 
Not surprisingly, the strength of the Drafters' commitment 
in section 6.01(a) to the application of one state's law has 
spawned one of Project's more significant debates. Professor 
Symeonides is quick to point out that the Project's aim of ap- 
plying a single law to all similar claims against a defendant is 
only "[olne of the purposes of Chapter 6."92 After all, the sin- 
gle-law objective is not unqualified in the text of Chapter 6 
since the Drafters provide courts with several "escape hatches." 
First, subsection 6.01(b) authorizes subdivision into subgroups 
of "claims, issues, or parties" and allows more than one state's 
law to apply if applying a single law would be inappropriate in 
the court's opinion.93 Second, the same subsection authorizes 
the court to sever and remand to the transferor courts claims 
or issues that "should [not] be governed by the law chosen by 
the application of the rules [of Chapter 6]."94 The Drafters 
clearly contemplated the subsection's use on some scale, and it 
seems that a liberal construction of subsection 6.01(b) is within 
the realm of reason. 
Third, subsection 6.01(e), which is to be employed in order 
to "avoid[] unfair surprise or arbitrary results," has been inter- 
preted to be a mechanism to vindicate concerns of the parties 
rather than those of the state.95 Thus, subsection 6.01(e) al- 
lows the court to inject additional connectors into its choice 
analysis when proper. 
90. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 305-06. 
91. See id. 5 6.01(b). 
92. Symeonides, supra note 5, at 859. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 860 (quoting COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 
$ 6.01(b)). 
95. See Kozyris, supra note 3, at 965. Kozyris regards the "unfair surprise" 
escape hatch of subsection 6.01(e) as a means for introducing better-fitted connec- 
tors to courts' analysis in the consolidated context. Id. at 975. 
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An even more liberal construction of both subsections (b) 
and (e) is warranted, especially considering the heated debate 
over the propriety of subsection 6.01(d)'s rigid formulations. 
A s  has been discussed elsewhere,g6 subsection 6.01(c) enu- 
merates the factors or contacts the court should consider when 
determining which states have "legitimate interests" in having 
their state tort policies applied to the case." These criteria 
are the place of injury, conduct, business, or habitual residenc- 
es of the plaintiffs and  defendant^.^' The function of subseo 
tion 6.01(d) is to prioritize the interests of the states identified 
by subsection 6.01(c) if more than one state has an interest 
that would be furthered by the application of its law to the 
case." In the case of a widely dispersed mass tort (e.g., Agent 
Orange, Dalkon Shield, Bendectin-DES, and asbestos) subsec- 
tions 6.01(d)(l)-(3) will almost never apply to the case, since all 
three of those subsections are premised upon common residen- 
cy. For example, (d)(l) provides that if the place of the injury 
and the place of the conduct causing the injury are the same 
state, that state's law applies.loO Also, (d)(2) would call for ap- 
plication of the law of the state where all of the plaintiffs habit- 
ually reside or have their place of business and the defendant 
also has its principal place of busine~s.'~' Finally, (d)(3) is the 
third tie-breaking rule: the law of the state of all the plaintiffs' 
habitual residences or principal places of business will apply if 
that state is also the place of injury. It should be clear that 
these three tests will almost never be met in the case of even 
moderately dispersed torts, although they may match up nicely 
with certain single-site events or mass-accident cases.lo2 
Therefore, in dispersed tort litigation, subsection 6.01(d)(4) 
will almost always apply since it is the catch-all preference rule 
of section 6.01: "In all other cases, the law of the state where 
the conduct causing the injury occurred governs. When conduct 
occurred in more than one state, the court shall choose the law 
of the conduct state that has the most significant relationship 
96. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
97. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, $ 6.01(c). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 8 6.01(c). 
100. Id. $ 6.01(d)(l). 
101. Id. $ 6.01(d)(2). 
102. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1641 (citing as examples Love Canal and a 
hypothetical Southwestern Airlines plane crash in Texas). 
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to the occ~rrence."'~~ The possibility for prodefendant bias is 
inherent in subsection 6.01(d)(4)'s preference for the law of the 
state where the conduct causing the injury took place, which in 
the case of dispersed torts is most likely to be the defendant's 
"home state." Therefore, to combat this potential bias as well as 
the significant potential for general unfairness, surprise, and 
irrationality created by the rigid, mechanical approaches of all 
of subsection 6.01(d), the "escape hatches" of subsections 
6.01(b) and (e) would best be used frequently, especially in the 
dispersed tort case. lo4 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A liberal construction and application of subsection 6.01(b) 
must be considered by Congress and by courts that may be 
called upon to interpret the Proposal's provisions even if they 
never become law.lo5 Liberal construction of subsection 
6.01(b) is mandated by the effect of the other rules of section 
6.01, which will not likely function adequately in the case of a 
dispersed mass tort.lo6 
Given the potential for surprising and unfair results in 
mass disaster cases, Congress and the courts would be well- 
advised to rethink the Project's choice of law strictures 
throughout, but given the potential for beneficial results under 
other sections of the proposed federal legislation, 
decisionmakers may be more likely to accept minor adjust- 
ments in the Project's approach rather than wholesale rejection 
or revision. A significant area for improvement of the Proposal 
is subsection 6.01(b), whose frequent and liberal application in 
mass torts cases should be welcomed by policy makers and 
scholars alike. 
While use of the escape hatch will not allow the complete 
simplification of choice of law analysis in the average consoli- 
dated case, many of the gains in efficiency, simplicity, and 
consistency can still be retained. Subdivision of litigants and 
claims and application of different states' laws to each sub- 
group will guarantee significant gains in efficiency, especially 
103. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL supra note 2, !l 6.01(d)(4). 
104. See generally supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
105. The very existence of the Proposal will undoubtedly make it an extremely 
influential source, like the various Restatements, for judges managing mass tort 
cases, even if the Proposal never sees the light of day in Congress. 
106. See Mullenix, supra note 43, at 1640. 
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when thousands of litigants are involved. While subsection 
6.01(b) may sacrifice, in the name of fairness, some of the effi- 
ciency gains envisioned by the Drafters, those sacrifices will 
not outweigh the gains in fairness. In summary, subsection 
6.01(b)'s liberal construction would have a procompetitive effect 
in that similar groups of litigants would be treated similarly, 
and the courts' task in choice of law analysis will still be signif- 
icantly simplified and expedited. 
The history of American choice of law analysis is a storied 
one, the only constant being debate and disagreement over the 
propriety of certain approaches. The circumstances surrounding 
the drafting and adoption of the Complex Litigation Project 
Proposal have been no different. The Proposal is the product of 
more than eight years of work by some of the brightest conflict 
of laws scholars in the land; its provisions will not be ignored. 
But they may yet be improved by increasing the potential fair- 
ness of the Project's choice of law procedures. 
Fred I. Williams 
